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Abstract
In this paper, we study how the uncertainty in the behavior of
judges provides parents going to separate with incentives to coop-
erate. We introduce a model of cooperative bargaining to describe
the behavior of parents whose preferences satisfy the characteri-
zation of risk averse/pessimistic types proposed by Yaari (1987)
in his Dual Decision Theory under Risk. The behavior of the
judge is modeled in a simple manner: he is either supposed to
follow a strict rule (we will say that he uses an imperative scale
of alimony), or he may use discretion (he uses an indicative scale
of alimony). The point is that for both parents the judgment
represents an external opportunity to divorce - the disagreement
point in negotiation. We show that the eﬀective decision of par-
ents (cooperation versus trial) depends on the speciﬁc structure
of the costs and risks associated with divorce procedures, such
that more uncertainty at trial increases the incentives to cooper-
ate for risk averse parents. Finally, we give a characterization of
the optimal degree of the judges’ discretionary power required to
maximize the parents’ gains from negotiation.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the eﬀects of discretionary power of judges in divorce
litigations. The main question is to know if the probability of coop-
erative bargaining increases when judges makes decisions which appear
as random for the parents. This problem is particularly acute in most
common law and civil law countries concerned by the introduction of
scales of child support. Considering that child support is the object of
disputes in a great number of divorce cases, legislators are interested in
evaluating whether alimonies have to be ﬁxed by the imperium of the
judge or if it could be eﬃcient to impose precise rules of calculus. Some
countries have already introduced scales of child support. Some of them
have chosen indicative systems (Canada, United-States...), but others
like England have already decided to impose strict rules, so that the es-
tablishment of child support appears to be an administrative task more
than a true court decision. Of course, the determination of child support
is generally based on allocative (costs of children) and/or redistributive
(resources of parents) grounds, but it seems important to consider the
problem of cooperation between the two parents. It is surprising to note
that this problem has not received much attention in the literature de-
voted to economics of the family even though it is an important question
from a law and economics perspective1. Exceptions concern the eﬀects of
the content of divorce rules on the behavior of parents (e.g. Mechoulan,
2005 considering no-fault divorce). But the way the rules are enforced
by the courts is not considered.
One can consider that the introduction of scales of child support
could generate more transparency and more predictability. This means
an improvement in parents’ information in divorce cases. In other words,
1Surprisingly enough, many judges are not favorable to the introduction of such
scales of alimony, arguing the existence of high auditing costs: respecting those scale
would imply more work for them, more time for each case of divorce, in order to
verify the adequacy between the case and the scale and so on... Thus, they would be
prone to accept only indicative scales, keeping some degree of freedom (thus, some
discretionary power) in the determination of the alimony, case by case.
2precise rules reduce information costs of litigants and adjudicators during
the trial. The intuition is that when matters are more diﬃcult to predict,
parties’ expectations over the outcome of the adjudication are more likely
to diverge. As a result, parties to a dispute will tend to settle less often
and the litigation rate will increase. In contrast, precise rules should
facilitate cooperative settlement. Moreover, considering divorce law, it
is important to note that parental cooperation is important not only
during litigation, but also after the courts’ decision because it could
increase collection of child support payments and the participation of
non-custodial parents in the education of children (Oldham and Melli,
2000). Empirical researches conﬁrms that divorce law negatively impacts
children’s welfare as a consequence of the reduction in monetary and
time contributions of the non-custodial parent (Del Boca and Ribero,
2003). With visitation and direct expenditures, child support transfers
ﬁxed by the courts has to be considered. The ﬁrst intuition is that it
could be important to limit the discretionary power of judge to facilitate
cooperation between parties. However, from an analytical point of view,
this is not so easy to demonstrate.
The economic analysis of legal dispute resolution generally explains
the choice of the parties between cooperative (agreement) and non co-
operative (judgement) solutions via strategic behaviors (Shavell (1982),
Cooter, Marks and Mnookin (1982), Bebchuck (1984)...). Informational
asymmetries can explain why a great number of conﬂicts end up in trial
even though a cooperative surplus exists. Using an approach in which
models determine the probability that the conﬂict is resolved through
trial rather than negotiation, it is possible to show that when informa-
tional asymmetries are reduced, cooperation increases. Therefore, in the
case of divorce law, one could argue that the determination of precise
guidelines for child support could reduce the asymmetries of information
between parents.
We aim to challenge this argument. If informational asymmetries
are of great importance in many circumstances, it is sometimes doubt-
ful that informational problems uniquely occur (if at all) between the
parties at trial. In divorce cases, for instance, it appears that neither
party has an informational advantage with respect to the issue of a dis-
pute settlement at trial. However, both are in a situation of uncertainty
in the sense that the decisions of the parties depend on their subjec-
tive expectations regarding the decision of the judge. Such situations
may occur for example when the legal rules are complex or ambiguous
(Kaplow, 1995). Another example is provided by the cases where courts
change their way of thinking, leading to an evolution of the jurispru-
dence that individuals have not yet understood because they hold on to
3expectations not fully updated (Viscusi, 1995).
In this spirit, we suggest a new way of thinking about cooperative
behavior in litigation games like divorce. While ignoring informational
asymmetries between parties, we explicitly deal with another kind of in-
formational problem resulting from the non observability of the judge’s
type or action by both parties, who can do nothing but assign an expec-
tation regarding the judge’s behavior. Moreover, in contrast with the
assumption made in the literature, we assume that the parties at trial are
no longer risk-neutral decision makers, but that their preferences are of
a more general nature, an asumption in line with the axioms of the Dual
Theory (DT thereafter) of Yaari (1987). Introducing this DT assump-
tion is both meaningful and powerful for several reasons. In contrast to
the usual purely subjectivist optimistic approach, it enables us to con-
sider a context in which both parties have some objective information
(probabilistic) with regard to the behavior of the judge that they may
use in assigning their own individual beliefs. At the same time, while
being in a strategic context in which the common knowledge assump-
tion is required, the DT of Yaari provides us with sound, axiomatically
founded but simple arguments to rationalize the disagreement in indi-
viduals’ beliefs: these are not pure probabilistic decision weights, but
they reﬂect the preferences of the individuals and speciﬁcally their risk
attitude.
Section 2 presents a basic model of the discretionary power of judges.
We show that with Yaari decision makers, the same information about
the judge’s behavior generates diﬀerent beliefs with regard to the court’s
decision. Section 3 analyzes divorce as a cooperative game between par-
ents. We compare strict rules versus discretion in the determination of
childsupport. Demonstrating that the more uncertain the judge’s behav-
ior, the higher the incentives to cooperate, we prove that the uncertainty
of the outcome at trial cannot per se explain the failure of cooperation
between parents. On the contrary, it should increase the incentives to
cooperate. Of course, this result is not inconsistent with redistributive
goals in the sense that more uncertainty could imply higher amounts
of child support. Finally, section 4 discusses the optimal degree of dis-
cretion which may maximize the gains of cooperation for the parents.
We show that the question of the optimal level of judge’s discretion is
a classical problem of risk sharing : probabilities have to be set so that
the less risk averse parent bears a larger share of the risk. Section 5
concludes and suggests possible extensions of the paper.
42 A simple model of judges’ discretionary power
2.1 The basic setup
In the following, we assume that the litigation between parents uniquely
comes from the monetary aspects of the divorce (amount of child sup-
port paid by the non custodial parent - NG thereafter - to the custodial
one - G)2. Hence, we take as reference the case in which parents agree
both on discontuing the marriage (they agree to divorce) and on child
custody: one of the parents voluntarily gives up child custody. While
at a ﬁrst glance this assumption may appear troublesome, it is in fact
both empirically reasonable and theoretically relevant. On the one hand,
more than 50% of recent divorces in France are obtained through ami-
cable settlements (joint demand and accepted demand), while in 85% of
divorces, one of the parents gives up child custody at the beginning of
the procedure. On the other hand, should the divorce legislation provide
adverse incentives to cooperation even if the parents would like to reach
an amicable divorce, then there is no reason to believe that this would
not also be the case when they are at strife and agree neither on the
custody of the children nor on the monetary settlement associated with
the divorce.
The issue of settlement in divorce may be seen as a negotiation game
with two possible outcomes for parents: either the negotiation is suc-
cessful, and parents reach an agreement corresponding to the value of
the monetary transfer between the NG parent and the G parent; or,
it is not, and the disagreement point is represented by the utility pair
obtained by parents when they go to trial.
We focus here on two polar cases depending on the behavior of the
judge. First, the parents may know that the judge will apply an im-
perative (i.e. legaly binding) scale: he can by no means deviate, and he
is bound to strictly apply it. In such a case, the household dissolution,
independently of the way it is obtained, is a non risky prospect for the
parents: the amount of child support, whether being ﬁxed by the par-
ents themselves or by the judge, is known with a probability equal to
1. Moreover, we assume that it will always be paid, since there is no
default of payment from the non custodial parent. In contrast, the law
may no longer commit a judge to strictly follow a scale of child support,
but gives him discretionary power in the choice of the allowance. Now
the judge has the opportunity to ignore the scale, which is only seen as
indicative.
2In order to avoid the confusion with costs, we do not use the index C and NC
(custodial and non custodial). Instead, we use G and NG for the presentation of the
model (though inapropriate, the letters for "guardian" and "non guardian").
5More generally, discretion may be the result of at least four diﬀerent
features characterizing the decision context for the judge and parents,
which are conceptually diﬀerent but formally equivalent here:
1- The judge may sometimes be mistaken when facing some cases
of divorce, and implicitly use the indicative scale of child support in an
irrelevant manner. Nevertheless, his mistakes are independently distrib-
uted in time (uncorrelated).
2- The judge always strictly applies a scale of child support (he always
uses a deterministic rule), but conditionaly on a private signal that he
observes3. Thus, the behavior of the judge is perceived as perfectly
discretionary (random) for the parents who do not observe the private
signal, whereas it is purely deterministic for the judge.
3- Law is not complete (there exist unforeseen contingencies) and/or
rules are complex to apply since they are tailored very precisely to acts,
requiring from the judge a quality of information on the behavior of the
parents more reﬁned than is realistically feasible.
4- When deciding to divorce, the parents do not know which judge
they will face; the latter may either be more favorable to the G parent or
to the NG parent. To put things diﬀerently, the choice of the type of the
judge is the result of an initial move of Nature, which is not observable
by the parents. As a consequence, divorce settlement at trial appears as
a risky procedure in contrast to cooperation.
To keep things simple, assume that the judge may choose between
three levels of child support (corresponding to three actions: B, A, R):
he follows the indicative schedule and sets b, or he sets a higher amount
a > b, or ﬁnally he reduces the allowance with regards to the scale
to r < b. The probabilities associated with each of these actions are
respectively: pb, pa and pr. Hence, a legaly binding scale of child support
is a particular case of an indicative one where the judge chooses b in a
deterministic manner (i.e. pb = 1 and pa = pr = 0). We also introduce
the following notations: c is the cost of a trial for both parents NG and
3This view may help us in explaining that there exist at the same time both a kind
of intercohort (between Courts) heterogeneity as well as an intracohort (speciﬁc to
each Court) homogeneity in courts’ decisions. The apparent heterogeneity in family
judges’s decisions as perceived by individuals or exhibited in panel or survey data
would be explained by the existence of a commitment or discipline device between
judges belonging to the same Tribunal. Such a commitment makes that the decision
of a judge must be conform to a common rule internal to the Tribunal, while the
law gives a great degree of freedom in the design of this discipline: as a result,
there would exist a great homogeneity in the decisions of the judges operating in the
same Tribunal, compatible with more heterogeneity with regards to those taken in
diﬀerent Tribunals; for studies concluding to the existence of a great homogeneity in
the behavior of judges attached to a same Tribunal, see Ray (2003) and Jeandidier
(2003).
6G; δ is the amount of child support resulting from the direct bargaining
between the parents. We assume that the costs incurred by the parents
when they negotiate are nil.
Since for the parents everything goes as if the judge may randomly
choose between three actions A, B or R, we have to deal with uncer-
tainty in the representation of their preferences: we will assume that
the parents’ preferences satisfy the axioms of the Dual Theory of Yaari
(1987)4, which is a generalization of the more common place expected
utility approach à la Von Neumann-Morgenstern.
2.2 Preferences: the Dual Theory of Yaari
The main advantage of Yaari’s approach is that it allows us to main-
tain the technically tractable assumption of constant marginal utility of
wealth, while at the same time capturing non neutrality to risk.
Deﬁnition 1 Assume that individual preferences satisfy the axioms of
the Dual Theory of Yaari; then there exists a probability transforma-
tion function ϕ (continuous, increasing, and unique), with ϕ(0) = 0 and
ϕ(1) = 1, such that for any feasible decision X corresponding to the ran-
dom variable (x1,p1;...xn,pn), with
￿n
i=1 pi = 1, and assuming without
loss of generality x1 < ... < xi < ... < xn, the functional representa-
tion of the individual’s preferences is given by the following real-valued
function:
V (X) =
n ￿
i=1
￿
ϕ
￿
n ￿
j=i
pj
￿
− ϕ
￿
n ￿
j=i+1
pj
￿￿
xi
where ϕ
￿￿n
j=i pj
￿
− ϕ
￿￿n
j=i+1 pj
￿
is the individual’s subjective likeli-
hood of the outcome xi; by deﬁnition, this is the diﬀerence between the
transformation of two cumulative probabilities: the ﬁrst one is associ-
ated with the event “the outcome is at least xi” and the second one is
associated with the event “the outcome is strictly larger than xi”.
The basic meaning of the approach proposed by Yaari may be easily
understood. To begin with, ﬁrst notice that the value-function repre-
senting the preferences is nothing else but a weighted sum of outcomes
V (X) =
￿n
i=1 hixi = Eϕ(X), where the decision weights hi are no more
4This axiomatic-based decision model is a particular case both of “Rank-
Dependent-Expected-Utility” theories (Quiggin, 1982)) and of ”Cumulative Prospect
Theory” (Wakker and Tversky, 1993)) - this last being a generalization of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)’s approach.
7individual probabilities but subjective likelihoods. Secondly, observe
that:
V (X) = x1 +
n−1 ￿
i=2
ϕ
￿
n ￿
j=i
pj
￿
(xi+1 − xi)
i.e. the individual proceeds to a pessimistic evaluation of his prospects.
To evaluate a decision, he considers the most unfavorable outcome x1,
and then evaluates his chances to be better oﬀ, weighting each additional
increase in his outcome (xi+1 − xi) with a decision weight ϕ
￿￿n
j=i pj
￿
deﬁned as the subjective transformation of the probability to be better
oﬀ (ϕ
￿￿n
j=i pj
￿
= P(X ≥ xi)).
Interestingly enough, despite a constant marginal utility of wealth,
the decision maker is no longer risk neutral. It can be shown that risk
aversion (respectively risk seeking) in the usual sense of aversion to any
Mean Preserving Spread à la Rothschild & Stiglitz, is equivalent to the
concept of pessimism (optimism) which may be characterized as follows5:
Theorem 2 (Yaari (1987))
i) The decision maker is pessimistic iﬀ ϕ￿￿ > 0,∀p ∈ [0,1]. Moreover,
ϕ￿￿ > 0 ⇒ ϕ(p) < p,∀p ∈ [0,1] and Eϕ(X) < E(X).
ii) In contrast, the decision maker is optimistic iﬀ ϕ￿￿ < 0,∀p ∈ [0,1].
Moreover, ϕ￿￿ < 0 ⇒ ϕ(p) > p,∀p ∈ [0,1] and Eϕ(X) > E(X).
This means that when a decision maker is pessimistic/risk-averse
(respectively optimistic/risk-seeking), he underestimates (overestimates)
any probability value, and assesses a value to the prospect which is
smaller (larger) than its mathematical expectation.
2.3 Individual assessments of the outcome at trial
Assume that parents are Yaari-decision makers, with parent NG having
a probability distortion function denoted f(p), while parent G has a
probability distortion function g(p), where f and g are supposed to be
twice diﬀerentiable.
5In decision theory, this concept of pessimism is also called “probabilistic risk
aversion”: word by word, it means that individuals do not like probabilities mixtures.
This alternative view highlights the interest and relevance of our approach, since
probabilities mixtures may be produced by the existence of noise in the observable
information of individuals.
8It is easy to see how the parents assess the likelihoods associated
with the outcomes corresponding to the decisions “go to trial” and “ne-
gotiate”. Negotiation is not a risky decision (the value of the transfer is
known with a probability equal to 1). In contrast, trial is risky, since the
judge may choose between three actions A, B or R, such that the child
support is a random variable X = (pb,b;pa,a;pr,r) whose mathematical
expectation is E(X) = pb.b + pa.a + pr.r.
The following table shows the outcome and the associated likelihood
for the NG parent (left table; parent NG face the prospect −X, since
he pays the child support) and the G parent (right table; parent G faces
the prospect X), depending on the decision of the judge to apply A, B
or R, with the assumption r < b < a:
outcome likelihood
−a − c 1 − f(pb + pr)
−b − c f(pb + pr) − f(pr)
−r − c f(pr)
outcome likelihood
r − c 1 − g(pb + pa)
b − c g(pb + pa) − g(pa)
a − c g(pa)
- the most unfavorable outcome for NG would be to pay a: the likeli-
hood weight associated with this event is 1−f(pb+pr); the intermediate
result (pay b) obtains the weight f(pb +pr)−f(pr); ﬁnally, the most fa-
vorable outcome is coupled with the weight f(pr).
- for parent G, the most unfavorable outcome is when he receives
r: he gives this event the weight 1 − g(pa + pb); the intermediate result
(receive b) obtains the likelihood g(pa + pb) − g(pa), while the weight of
the most favorable event (obtain a) is g(pa).
This reveals that parents do not have the same beliefs over the con-
sequences of the judge’s decisions:
judge plays belief for NG belief for G
A 1 − f(pb + pr) g(pa)
B f(pb + pr) − f(pr) g(pb + pa) − g(pa)
R f(pr) 1 − g(pb + pa)
and everything goes as if each parent assesses his own subjective
expectation of the outcome at trial, respectively for the NG parent6 and
the G parent:
Eng(X) = (1 − f(pb + pr))a + (f(pb + pr) − f(pr))b + f(pr)r
Eg(X) = g(pa)a + (g(pb + pa) − g(pa))b + (1 − g(pb + pa))r
6Since parent NG faces the risk −X, his true subjective expectation of this
risk is Efop(−X); hence, to be more rigourous, we should have written Eng(X) =
−Efop(−X). For parent G, we have Eg(X) = Egop(X). However, our notation rules
out secondary diﬃculties.
9Note: It is easily seen that Eng(X) ￿= Eg(X) ￿= E(X); but when
f = g = Id, we are back to the usual risk neutral-Bayesian world, where
both NG and G have the same beliefs about the judge’s decision, and
evaluate the outcome at trial as its mathematical expectation.
Notice that in contrast to the usual optimistic approach in litigation
settlement, where individual biases are purely subjective, here we suggest
a case where biases are rational. The behavior of the judge is common
knowledge, hence probabilities lead to common priors for both parents,
while they have diﬀerent preferences over the ranking of the outcomes
induced by the judge’s decisions: as a result, they have diﬀerent posterior
beliefs concerning the outcomes of the judge’s behavior.
It is easy to evaluate the consequences of this bias when parents are
pessimistic/risk averse: using theorem 2, we have: f￿￿ > 0 ⇒ Eng(X) >
E(X), i.e. is NG overestimates the child support to be paid at trial, and
g￿￿ > 0 ⇒ Eg(X) < E(X), i.e. is G underestimates the child support to
be obtained at trial. The opposite inequalities apply in case of optimistic
parents.
3 Cooperation under exogenous uncertainty
3.1 Pareto eﬃcient agreements
We ﬁrst describe the set of agreements that may be obtained by parents
such that there exists no other (feasible) agreement leading to additional
gains of welfare (a Pareto improvement) for them. For ease of exposition,
we denote a − b = ∆1 and b − r = ∆2. The basic result is the following:
Proposition 3 Assume that:
c +
Eng(X) − Eg(X)
2
≥ 0 (1)
Then, there exist two real numbers WAg ￿= WPng, such that any δ ∈
[WAg,WPng] is a Pareto optimal agreement.
Proof. For parent NG, we have: Vng(J) = −c − Eng(X) and Vng(N) =
−δ; thus N is better than J if δ < Eng(X) +c ≡ WPng. Symmetrically,
for parent G: Vg(J) = −c + Eg(X) and Vg(N) = δ; thus N is better
than J if δ > Eg(X) − c ≡ WAg. It is straightforward to verify that
WAg ≤ WPng if condition (1) holds. Moreover, there exists no value of
δ outside of [WAg,WPng] being welfare improving for parents.
10It makes sense to call the higher bound of the negotiation interval
the willingness to pay of the NG parent: WPng is the maximum amount
that the NG parent may accept to pay, while being indiﬀerent between
cooperating and going to trial. By the same token, the lower bound will
be called the parent G’s willingness to accept: WAg is the minimum
amount he accepts from the NG parent, and makes him indiﬀerent be-
tween cooperation and going to trial. The willingness to pay of NG and
the willingness to accept of G are the sum of two terms; the ﬁrst one is
the associated willingness to pay or accept when the judge is supposed
to strictly apply the child support (i.e. b+c and b−c respectively, when
pb = 1 and pa = pr = 0); the second one is a correction in order to take
into account the risk of trial.
3.2 Solution to the cooperative divorce
A long and important stream of literature is devoted to the bargaining
problem7. In order to focus on the main issue of our paper, we simply
assume that parents are engaged in a cooperative divorce - and we use
a basic concept in cooperative games, known as the (symmetric) Nash
solution.
According to this view, the agreement δ
∗ reached by the parents is
deﬁned as the maximand of the Nash product (Vng(N)−Vng(J))(Vg(N)−
Vg(J)), and the gains of cooperation for parents are deﬁned by:
γ
∗ = max
δ
(WPng − δ)(δ − WAg)
Proposition 4 Assume that (1) holds. Then:
i) δ
∗ is the weighted sum of WPng and WAg;
ii) γ∗ has two components: 1/ the transaction costs at trial, and 2/
the diﬀerence between parents’ subjective expectation of the outcome at
trial.
Proof. i) Under condition (1), the ﬁrst order qualiﬁcation condition
gives the value of δ
∗, which may be written as :
δ
∗ ≡
1
2
(WPng + WAg) =
Eng(X) + Eg(X)
2
with Eng(X)+Eg(X) = 2b+[1 − f(1 − pa) + g(pa)]∆1−[1 − g(1 − pr) + f(pr)]∆2.
7See the illuminating synthesis proposed by Muthoo (1999); it is well known
since Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinski (1986) that the solution of any sequential
bargaining problem à la Rubinstein, where parties alternate in making oﬀers/counter-
oﬀers to the other party in order to reach an agreement may be as well understood as
the solution of a cooperative bargaining game à la Nash if appropriately reformulated.
11ii) Substituting in the value-function of the problem, we obtain the
cooperative gains as:
γ
∗ ≡
1
4
(WPng − WAg)
2 =
￿
c +
Eng(X) − Eg(X)
2
￿2
where Eng(X)−Eg(X) = [1−f(1−pa)−g(pa)]∆1+[1−g(1−pr)−
f(pr)]∆2.
The complete comparative static analysis for δ
∗ and γ∗ obviously
comes from the properties of WPng and WAg (left to the reader) and
heavily depends on the assumption on the risk sensibility of parents. In
this spirit, the following paragraph investigates more deeply the impact
of uncertainty at trial on the size of the negotiation gains.
3.3 Imperative versus indicative scales of child sup-
port
Let us discuss the central result of the paper according to which uncer-
tainty created by judges enhance parents’ incentives to cooperate in the
shadow of the law, beginning with the following note:
Note: When parents are risk neutral (f = g = Id), or simply have
the same probability transformation, we obtain: δ
∗ ≡ E(X) and γ∗ ≡ c2.
Then, it is possible to evaluate whether rules are better than discre-
tion in giving parents incentives to cooperate. Everything else equal,
we will say that an indicative scale of child support is equivalent to an
imperative (i.e. legaly binding) scale of child support if both yield the
same cooperative gains. Conversely, we will say that the indicative scale
is better (worse) than the imperative scale, that is if it is associated with
higher (smaller) cooperative gains.
Corollary 5 i) Both scales are equivalent when the parents are risk neu-
tral.
ii) The indicative scale is better when parents are both risk-averse.
iii) The imperative scale is better when parents are both risk-seeking.
Proof. In the case of an imperative scale of child support (i.e. with
pb = 1 and pa = pr = 0), the gains associated with cooperation amount
to c2. Then:
i) In case of an indicative scale of child support, risk neutral parents
have the same assessment about the outcome at trial, i.e. Eng(X) =
Eg(X) = E(X). Hence the result.
12ii) is also straightforward, since when both parents are risk averse:
Eng(X) > E(X) > Eg(X). iii) is left to the reader.
In other words when parents are not risk sensitive, discretion pro-
vides no more advantages than a ﬁxed rule, in the sense that it gives no
additional incentives to cooperate. In contrast, when both parents are
pessimistic/risk-averse, the indicative scale of child support gives more
incentives to cooperate than the imperative one: a settlement at trial
implies excessive risk for both parents since each overestimates his own
subjective likelihood that the settlement at trial leads to the most un-
favorable result for himself (paying a for NG, receiving r for G). The
opposite is obtained when both parents are optimistic/risk-seeking8.
Second, we prove that increasing uncertainty is favorable to the co-
operation for risk averse parents. In the following, we assume that the
judge uses a randomization with pa,pb,pr > 0.
Proposition 6 Assume that parents are risk averse and face a pure
increase in risk at trial, in the sense of a Mean Preserving Spread (MPS);
then:
i) WPng increases and WAg decreases;
ii) γ∗ increases;
iii) Moreover, assume that pa ≤ pr, and that f￿ and g￿ are convex.
If g￿ is more (less) convex than f￿, then δ
∗ increases (respectively de-
creases).
Proof. By deﬁnition, if parents are risk averse, any MPS at trial de-
creases their expected utility level. Thus, i) and ii) are straightforward
since by deﬁnition: WTng ≡ −Vng(J) and WAg ≡ Vg(J).
In order to prove iii), consider a simultaneous shift in pa and pr such
that E(X) is kept constant9 and pa ≤ pr; it is easy to check that we
have:
sign
∂δ
∗
∂pa
= sign((f
￿(1 − pa) − f
￿(pr)) − (g
￿(1 − pr) − g
￿(pa)))
Assume that g￿ is more convex than f￿: given that pa + pr < 1, and
1−pa > 1−pr, then applying a result by Roëll (1987, proposition II.4)10,
we obtain:
8Notice that we obtain an ambiguous result when the parents display the opposite
risk sensibility.
9In order to generate a Mean-Preserving Spread, we require that the simultaneous
shifts of pa and pr satisfy the following condition: ∆1.dpa − ∆2.dpr = 0.
10See also condition (A) thereafter.
13f￿(1 − pa) − f￿(pr)
1 − pa − pr
≥
g￿(1 − pa) − g￿(pr)
1 − pa − pr
On the other hand, deﬁning α = pr − pa ≥ 0 and using once more
that pa + pr < 1, by the convexity assumption of g￿ we have:
g
￿(1 − pr) − g
￿(pa) ≤ g
￿(1 − pr + α) − g
￿(pa + α) = g
￿(1 − pa) − g
￿(pr)
Hence f￿(1−pa)−f￿(pr) ≥ g￿(1−pr)−g￿(pa), and as a result
∂γ∗
∂pa ≥ 0.
The case where g￿ is less convex than f￿ may be proven by the same
argument, and is left to the reader.
The analogue applies to optimistic/risk seeking parents.
Hence, more uncertainty at trial 1/ facilitates cooperation between
risk averse parents because it increases the range of the bargaining set
[WAg,WPng], and 2/ it enhances the incentives of risk averse parents to
cooperate since it increases the gains of cooperation (WAg−WPng). On
the other hand, it should be argued that uncertainty may also have per-
verse eﬀects. As the risk at trial increases, the advantage of the relatively
less risk averse party to the bargaining may be strengthened, while the
position of the more risk averse parent is weakened. As a result, it may
be the case that the agreement on child support is reached for a smaller
value of the transfer. In fact, as shown in part iii) of proposition 8, even
when the shift in risk at trial is a priori more unfavorable to parent
G than to parent NG (in the sense that pr > pa), it may be the case
that more uncertainty ends up in an increase in the transfer between
risk averse parents. The proof explicitly shows that the risk aversion
assumption is not suﬃcient in order to unambiguously sign this eﬀect,
but more conditions about parents’ preferences are required, speciﬁcally
here on their probability transformation (we need more than f, g convex
and g more convex than f)11.
4 Optimal discretion and cooperation
In the previous section we worked with a purely exogenous uncertainty,
since the probabilities (pa,pb,pr) are set on a priori ground and may take
11Although this ﬁnding may appear counterintuitive, it is not surprising in a con-
text of rational decision making. For example, risk averse consumers need not nec-
essarily increase their savings when they face more uncertainty: they must also be
prudent (i.e. u￿￿￿ > 0 for expected utility consumers, that is u￿ must be convex; see
Kimball (1990)).
14any value. We consider now a kind of endogenous uncertainty, specif-
ically through an explicit choice of randomization for the judge. Our
model may be understood12 as the reduced form of a more general one,
where a population of judges are randomly dealing with a population
of divorce cases (couples going to divorce). Knowing the characteristics
of parents, judges (who have no speciﬁc preferences for their own) may
seek to maximize their cooperative gains. Notice also that in such a
more general model, it would be possible to justify that this social goal
comprises (implies) the minimization of the social costs associated with
divorces settlement13.
Formally, we focus on the socially optimal degree of discretion, cor-
responding to the socially eﬃcient values of the steady state frequencies
(pb,pa,pr) with which the three actions (B,A,R) are used by judges,
leading to the maximization of the negotiation gains for the population
of parents:
γ(pa,pr) ≡
￿
c + [1 − f(1 − pa) − g(pa)]
∆1
2
+ [1 − g(1 − pr) − f(pr)]
∆2
2
￿2
We have the following result:
Proposition 7 i) Assume that both parents are pessimistic; then the
judge should choose (p∗
a,p∗
r), the probabilities associated with the pure
strategies A and R , in such a way that for each of those strategies,
the diﬀerence between the likelihood that the judge plays this strategy as
evaluated by parent NG and the one evaluated by parent G, be maximum.
ii) When both parents are optimistic, the judge should never deviate
from the scale of child support.
Proof. i) When both parents are pessimistic, γ(pa,pr) is a concave
function. The ﬁrst order conditions:
f
￿(1 − p
∗
a) − g
￿(p
∗
a) = 0 (2)
12See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) about the debate on the play of mixed strate-
gies.
13In France, one of the justiﬁcations, at least for the legislator, in favor of scales of
alimony is that they may help in reducing the congestion eﬀects of courts specialized
in family law. More than half of the decisions taken by the “Tribunaux de Grande
Instance” are in fact taken by judges specialized in family law: a great majority of
those decisions concern the issue of child support; see for example Munoz-Perez and
Ancel (2000).
15g
￿(1 − p
∗
r) − f
￿(p
∗
r) = 0 (3)
thus fully characterize the choice of (p∗
a,p∗
r), with p∗
b = 1 − p∗
a − p∗
r.
By deﬁnition, 1−f(1−p∗
a) is nothing else but the likelihood for parent
NG that the judge plays A and g(p∗
a) is the likelihood for parent G that
the judge plays A; then, condition (2) explains that in order to maximize
the gains from negotiation, the judge has to play A with probability p∗
a
such that the diﬀerence between the likelihood of the parents is also
maximal. By the same token, 1 − g(1 − p∗
r) is the likelihood for parent
G that the judge plays R and f(p∗
r) is the likelihood for parent NG that
the judge plays R; hence, condition (3) says that R must be played with
probability p∗
r, such that the diﬀerence between those likelihoods is also
maximal.
ii) Now, when both parents are optimistic, it is easy to see that
γ(pa,pr) is a convex function; moreover, 1 − f(p) − g(p) < 0 for any p:
thus the maximum of γ(pa,pr) is obtained for p∗
b = 1 and p∗
a = p∗
r = 0.
In words, if the social objective is to give parents eﬃcient incentives
to cooperate during divorce, then the judge’s best strategy is to take into
account the parents’ beliefs about own decisions, making these beliefs
the most divergent possible. However, this objective cannot be reached
when parents are risk-neutral or risk-seeking individuals.
Finally, we prove a last useful result concerning the relationship
between the mixed strategy played by the judge and the comparative
pessimism/risk-aversion index of the parents.
Proposition 8 Assume that both parents are pessimistic; then:
i) f(p) = g(p),∀p ∈ [0,1] ⇒ p∗
a = p∗
r = 1
2 and p∗
b = 0.
ii) if parent G is more risk-averse than parent NG, then p∗
a ≥ 1
2 and
p∗
r ≤ 1
2 , with p∗
b = 1 − p∗
a − p∗
r ≥ 0.
iii) if parent NG is more risk-averse than parent G, then p∗
a ≤ 1
2 and
p∗
r ≥ 1
2, with p∗
b = 1 − p∗
a − p∗
r ≥ 0.
Proof. i) Consider the values (p∗
a,p∗
r) which satisfy conditions (2) and
(3). Since both functions f and g are monotone and unique, the result
is straightforward.
ii) Let us ﬁrst introduce the characterization of the notion of “more
risk-averse than” in the context of Yaari’s model, which parallels the
16famous characterization obtained by Pratt for expected utility individ-
uals: Yaari (1987) shows that for two decision makers with probabil-
ity transformation functions ϕ1,ϕ2 respectively, ϕ2 displays more risk-
aversion/pessimism than ϕ1, iﬀ ϕ2 is a convex transformation ϕ1. Roëll
(1987, proposition II.4) shows that for all (p,q) satisfying 0 ≤ q < p < 1,
this implies:
(A) :
ϕ1(p) − ϕ1(q)
p − q
≥
ϕ2(p) − ϕ2(q)
p − q
Now, assume by contradiction that p∗
a ≤ 1
2 ⇒ p∗
a ≤ 1 − p∗
a; then,
using (A) and the convexity assumption of f and g, we obtain:
f
￿(1 − p
∗
a) ≥
f(p∗
a) − f(1 − p∗
a)
p∗
a − (1 − p∗
a)
≥
g(p∗
a) − g(1 − p∗
a)
p∗
a − (1 − p∗
a)
≥ g
￿(p
∗
a)
hence a contradiction with condition (2). Similarly, assume p∗
r ≥
1
2 ⇒ p∗
r ≥ 1 − p∗
r; as a result using (A) and the convexity assumption of
f and g, we have: f￿(p∗
r) ≥ g￿(1 − p∗
r), hence a contradiction now with
condition (3).
iii) may be obtained using the same argument.
The intuitive meaning of this last proposition is quite simple. The
problem amounts to the optimal sharing of risk between parents. When
both parents are equally risk-averse, the judge sets probabilities so as to
give the same incentives to both parents (they bear the same risk). But
in the case of one of the parents having more risk-aversion, the judge
should set the probabilities associated to the play of A and R in such a
way that this more risk-averse parent bears less risk than the other: as
a result, the latter obtains more incentives to cooperate.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed Nash bargaining in divorce cases. In this
context, we show that the way parents solve their dispute about child
support (settlement versus court decisions) depends on transaction costs
and on the behavior of the judge. Our main conclusion is that the incen-
tives to cooperate increase for risk-averse parents when the judge uses a
random strategy. The originality of the paper is that risk aversion is not
modeled in the standard expected utility framework, but with a partic-
ular rank dependent expected utility model with linear utility function:
we want to insist on the uncertainty generated by the courts’ decisions
rather than on the asymmetries of information between parents. Eco-
nomics of litigation generally insists on this last kind of asymmetries
17to explain the probability of settlement (i.e. the cooperative solution).
But in divorce law, informational asymmetries between parents are not
so important and the argument of unpredictability of courts outcomes
also needs to be explored. One can observe that the same kind of argu-
ment could be developed in liability law and personal injury settings.
From a normative perspective, our analysis suggests some directions
for divorce law. In practice, a great number of countries are currently
engaged in policy reforms introducing scales of child support. So, it is
possible to consider that the introduction of strict guidelines for child
support - limitation of the discretionary power of judges - does not rep-
resent a good way to encourage cooperative behavior with risk averse
people. In this case, if improving cooperation is socially valuable, dur-
ing and after the litigation, our recommendation should be to promote
indicative guidelines and not to impose restrictive calculus. Moreover, if
we consider redistributive aspects, it is important to note that the discre-
tionary power of judges could also contribute to an increase in resources
available for child support.
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